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ABSTRACT
Despite recent progress, deep neural networks generally continue to be vulnerable to so-called
adversarial examples—input images with small perturbations that can result in changes in the output
classifications, despite no such change in the semantic meaning to human viewers. This is true
even for seemingly simple challenges such as the MNIST digit classification task. In part, this
suggests that these networks are not relying on the same set of object features as humans use to make
these classifications. In this paper we examine an additional, and largely unexplored, cause behind
this phenomenon—namely, the use of the conventional training paradigm in which the entire input
space is parcellated among the training classes. Owing to this paradigm, learned decision spaces for
individual classes span excessively large regions of the input space and include images that have no
semantic similarity to images in the training set. In this study, we train models that include a null
class. That is, models may “opt-out” of classifying an input image as one of the digit classes. During
training, null images are created through a variety of methods, in an attempt to create tighter and more
semantically meaningful decision spaces for the digit classes. The best performing models classify
nearly all adversarial examples as nulls, rather than mistaking them as a member of an incorrect
digit class, while simultaneously maintaining high accuracy on the unperturbed test set. The use
of a null class and the training paradigm presented herein may provide an effective defense against
adversarial attacks for some applications. Code for replicating this study will be made available at
https://github.com/mattroos/null_class_adversarial_defense.
Keywords Adversarial attacks · Deep neural networks
1 Introduction
Shortly after the resurgence of deep neural networks as machine learning models for object and image classification
[1, 2] it was realized that modest image perturbations could be made such that these models incorrectly classify an
image, with high classification probability [3]. In some case these perturbations are imperceptible to humans, suggesting
that these models do not rely on the same causal features as humans for visual perception, and that decision boundaries
between classes are extremely close to some image samples. In this work we address the latter issue, speculating as to
the reason for its existence, and investigating a training approach that attempts to mitigate the problem.
Imagine training a child to classify images of squares and diamonds as belonging to their respective classes. If we then
show the child a picture of a circle, an eight-pointed star, or white noise, they are likely to declare the object to be
neither a square or a diamond—a perfectly acceptable response. Yet when it comes to machine learning models, this is
precisely the behavior we do not allow the conventional model to exhibit under such ambiguity. That is, the model is
trained on N classes and the model architecture allows N outputs. The model is forced to parcellate the input space into
N decision spaces that together fill the entire input space. However, for most models and tasks, true samples (whether
∗https://binarycognition.com/mattroos/
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used for training or not) exist in only a small subset of the input space. We speculate that this situation, coupled with the
high dimensionality of the input space (e.g., 224× 224 = 50176 dimensions for the typical ImageNet model), results in
samples near decision boundaries that are orthogonal to latent dimensions with no semantic meaning. In the following
section we present results from a simple toy problem designed to allow us to visualize this dilemma.
Although the challenge of defending against adversarial examples is most often conveyed with photographic imagery
like that of ImageNet, it persists in simpler tasks and smaller models as well, such as MNIST. While progress has been
made, even what is arguably the most successful defense by a conventional CNN model [4] has been shown to be
susceptible to certain types of adversarial images [5]. There has been greater success when using other model forms,
however. Using an analysis by synthesis approach, Schott and colleagues [5] demonstrate an MNIST model that is
highly effective in defending against adversarial examples, and produces digit predictions that align well with human
perception—i.e., classification "mistakes" on adversarial examples occur when the perturbations push the image toward
one of a different class, as perceived by humans, such as altering the upper portion of a 4 so that it appears more similar
to a 9. Yet, we note that their model is unlike a conventional feedforward CNN—rather, it uses gradient descent during
inference to find an optimal solution based on maximizing the lower bound on the log-likelihood for each class. While
the approach provides good results, it is computationally very expensive in comparison with conventional CNN models,
and is unlikely to provide a practical defense against adversarial attacks on more challenging tasks, under currently
available hardware.
The models we investigate in this report have architectures that allow N+1 outputs, for a task with N object classes.
This N+1th class is a null class that is conceptually equivalent to a "no-decision" by the model. We find that these
models, when trained with null samples in addition to the standard training samples, classify unperturbed images nearly
as well as their baseline counterparts yet are adept at detecting perturbed images—thereby provided a computationally
affordable way to defend against adversarial attacks.
2 A motivational example
In this section we present a demonstrative toy model and two methods of training—a conventional method and one that
includes null samples. We highlight the characteristics of the learned decision spaces within the input space, and the
susceptibility of the conventionally-trained model to adversarial attacks.
Our toy environment is a linear array of three pixels and our toy classes are composed of two adjacent pixels for two
classes—a down ramp and an up ramp. Examples of objects with these classes are shown in Figure 1. The sizes of the
objects and input space were chosen such that (1) the toy model can be a convolutional neural network (CNN), the
model type utilized in most research studies on adversarial attacks, and (2) the decision spaces within the 3D input
space can easily be visualized.
As shown in Figure 1, the prototype objects have pixel values of (2/3, 1/3) and (1/3, 2/3) for the down and up ramps,
respectively, and a ramp may exist in the left two pixels or the right two pixels of the three-pixel image. During training,
we create training samples by adding uniform noise of range [-0.05, 0.05] to the prototype images in each dimension,
then clipping the results to maintain input values in [0, 1]. Thus, the optimal decision spaces of a model are those
depicted in Figure 2—optimal in the sense that the spaces encapsulate the entire space of possible input images which
contain one of the two classes of objects, as defined above, and do not encapsulate input images outside of this space.
We constructed a simple CNN model for classifying down and up ramps. The layer-wise ordering is identical that
of our MNIST models (Table 1). The model was comprised of, in order: two consecutive convolutional layers with
2-pixel kernels (8 output channels and 16 output channels), a max pooling layer, a dense layer with 32 outputs, and
a dense layer with 3 outputs—two for the two ramp classes, and one for the null class. The architecture is unlikely
to be pertinent to the forthcoming results, but was chosen simply because it is the same as that of the MNIST CNN
architecture we used for other experiments, albeit with fewer channels and nodes.
We first trained the model in the conventional manner, using only training images that contained one of the two ramp
objects (no null samples). We trained on 20 epochs of 1000 samples, with a batch size of 32 images. Convergence
happened quickly, with near-perfect accuracy achieved after three epochs. We then probed the trained model, creating
input images that grid-sampled the 3D space, and determining the models output prediction for each of those inputs.
Figure 3 shows the results. As must be the case under this type of training, the decision spaces for the two classes
collectively span the entire input space, despite the fact that only a small subspace of each space contains representative
samples of its respective class. Importantly, the decision borders abut one another, and many locations of the up space
lie close to the locations of true down samples (compare Figures 2 and 3), and vice versa. In other words, the model is
clearly amenable to adversarial attacks.
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Figure 1: Left: Prototype “images” of two classes of objects (down ramps and up ramps) that may be embedded in
the three-pixel input space at one of two locations, for a total of four prototype images. Right: A random selection of
training images (rows). Training images are created by adding uniform noise to prototype images, and then clipping the
values to maintain a range of [0, 1] for all pixels.
Figure 2: The optimal decision spaces within the input space for the down ramps (magenta) and the up ramps (cyan). In
other words, the spaces that completely contain all ramp-containing input images, as defined in the text, but no other
input images.
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Figure 3: Decision spaces for a CNN model applied to the toy task, when trained in the conventional manner, without
null samples. Together the two decision spaces cover the entire input space, despite there being only small subspaces
that contain true up and down ramp images (see Figure 2). Left: The down (magenta) and up (cyan) decision spaces.
Middle: The down decision space alone. Right: The up decision space alone.
Figure 4: Decision spaces for a CNN model applied to the toy task, when trained with both ramp samples and with
uniform-noise null samples. Only the decision spaces for the down and up ramp classes are shown. All the remaining
regions of the input space constitute the null decision space. Decision spaces for the two ramp classes tightly constrain
the subspaces of true up and down ramp images, in contrast to when null samples are not used in training (Figure 3).
Left: the down (magenta) and up (cyan) decision spaces. Middle: The down decision space alone. Right: the up decision
space alone.
We then trained the model using uniform-noise null samples in addition to ramp samples. During training, 50% of
the up and down ramp samples were replaced with noise samples, with pixel values randomly chosen in [0, 1]. The
null samples were labeled as such (not as up or down samples). In contrast to the fast convergence under conventional
training, the model was trained for 30 epochs and was still converging at the end of training. However, very high
accuracy on up and down ramp samples was achieved early in the training, suggesting that much of the training
period involved tightening of the up and down decision spaces such that null samples would not be misclassified as
ramps. Figure 4 shows the ramp decision spaces of the model at the end of this training period. In contrast to those of
conventional training, they tightly encompass the true up and down ramp samples, leaving the remaining space as the
null class decision space. Thus, creating perturbed images that will be misclassified by this model is nearly impossible,
except when the perturbed image truly takes on the characteristics of the class predicted by the model—i.e., no longer
looking like an object from the class of the source image used to create the perturbed image.
Having demonstrated how conventional training might lead to decision spaces that are susceptible to adversarial attacks,
we hypothesize that this same scenario may hold true for MNIST (and more complex) tasks and models. We explore
this in the remainder of the paper.
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Table 1: MNIST network architecture
Layer type Input size Kernel size Rate Output size
Conv2D (28, 28, 1) (3, 3, 1) (26, 26, 32)
ReLU (26, 26, 32)
Conv2D (26, 26, 32) (3, 3, 1) (24, 24, 64)
ReLU (24, 24, 64)
MaxPool2D (24, 24, 64) (2, 2) (12, 12, 64)
Dropout (12, 12, 64) 0.25 (12, 12, 64)
Flatten (12, 12, 64) 9216
Dense 9216 128
Dropout 128 0.5 128
Dense 128 11
The architecture of all the MNIST-trained models, from input (top) to output (bottom). Layer type names (abbreviations)
are those of the Keras API for TensorFlow 2.1. Dropout layers were applied only during training. The layer structure of
the toy model was identical, but with different input, output, and kernel sizes (see text).
3 Network architecture
All models trained and tested in this study have the same architecture—a typical CNN of size comparable to most
modern networks trained for the MNIST classification task. The specific architecture is presented in Table 1. Given that
our goal was to explore methods of defending against adversarial attacks, we chose this conventional, well-performing
architecture rather than a particular “best” architecture, as measured by accuracy on the test set, or via other metric. Our
baseline model scored and average accuracy of 99.23% accuracy on the MNIST test set.
The only notable difference between our model’s architecture and that of typical MNIST CNNs is the use of eleven
output nodes rather than ten, to accommodate the null class in addition to the digit classes, 0 through 9.
4 Training methods
4.1 All models
Training (and testing) sample images were input to the models as a 28×28 matrices of 32-bit floating point numbers,
with a range of [0, 1]. Models were trained for 20 epochs with a batch size of 32 images. Here the term epoch refers to
60,000 training samples, but this does not map one-to-one to the 60,000 images in the MNIST training set. Instead,
training samples were drawn randomly and independently from the training set for each batch, and thus a single epoch
could exclude some training set images entirely, and could include repeats of unique training images. MNIST training
images were not augmented when used as digit training samples. MNIST training images were altered when used to
create some types of null samples (see below), but not in any manner similar to that traditionally done for training set
augmentation (e.g., translation or noise-addition).
For training that included 50% null samples (see below), the number of null and digit (non-null) samples in individual
batches was randomly determined by sampling from a uniform distribution such that the expected number of null and
digit samples was each equal to half of the batch size. Thus, in a given epoch the total expected number of null and
digit samples was 30,000 each. When multiple types of null samples were used for training, the type of sample for a
given null sample was randomly chosen with equal probability across types.
Neuron biases were initialized with zeros and weights were randomly initialized using the Glorot uniform method [6].
We used trained the models using cross-entropy loss and the Adam gradient descent optimizer [7] with the following
parameter values: α = 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,  = 10−08.
Many of the above details of the training regimen where chosen for coding convenience or reduction of training
durations, not for model performance reasons. For example, although not systematically tested, we suspect that precise
choices for batch size, parameter initialization, or optimization meta-parameters will not significantly impact any of the
findings reported herein.
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4.2 Baseline models
MNIST models typically have ten output nodes, one for each of digit classes. Our baseline models include an 11th
output node that corresponds to the null class. However, no null samples were used in training of baseline models and
thus it is very unlikely that the models will generate a null decision, regardless of the input. During testing on the
MNIST test set, as well as on null samples, we never observed a null decision by a baseline model.
4.3 Null-trained models
Null-trained models are those that were trained with null samples in addition to images from the MNIST training set.
On average, 50% of the training samples where null samples and 50% of the training samples were digit samples (and
thus roughly 5% of training samples belonged to an individual digit class). A much larger percentage of null samples
than individual digit samples was chosen because of the vastly larger ground truth space of the null class (see below).
We used three types of null samples, and trained models using all possible combinations of these types (resulting in
seven different null-trained models). In general, the goal of training with null samples is to constrain the decision spaces
of digit classes such that they generalize well to test samples, while classifying all other samples in the input space as
null samples, thereby mitigating the impact of adversarial examples. However, the input space is vast, even for small
images such as those of MNIST. The possible number of inputs for 28×28 images of 8-bit integers is:
28
28×28
= 256784 = 102.40824
784
> 101888
Thus, efficient sampling of the null samples from this space is imperative for success. Below, we describe the three
types of null samples used in training, and provide our reasoning for their selection. Examples of the null types are
shown in Figure 5.
4.3.1 Uniform-noise null samples
Uniform noise samples are images composed of i.i.d. pixel samples taken from a uniform distribution. They were
chosen because they provide broad, albeit sparse, sampling of the input space, most of which is null space. There is a
small overlap with the input space of ground truth digit decision spaces, but that overlap is exceptionally small, and
randomly created sample are extremely unlikely to fall within digit spaces.
4.3.2 Mixed-digit null samples
As suggested by the demonstrative toy model (Figure 3), there may exist regions of ground truth decision spaces that
are in close proximity to each other in Euclidean space, despite being a great distance apart in some latent semantic
space. Because conventional models fill the entire input space with digit decision spaces, it seems likely that adversarial
images may cross digit class boundaries at these Euclidean-proximal locations, and thus be misclassified. To promote
the learning of null spaces that create a Euclidean separation between digit decision spaces, we create null samples that
are simply the mean of two samples of different digit classes.
4.3.3 Shuffled-digit null samples
Finally, we create null samples from individual digit samples by tiling them at different scales and randomly shuffling
the tiles to create a new image. Tile sizes for image are randomly chosen from 1×1, 2×2, 4×4, 7×7, and 14×14 . All
images within a batch are tiled at the same scale and shuffled in the same order. The goal of these null samples is to
maintain some of the higher-order statistical properties of the training images, thereby creating samples that may be
closer to the digit samples along dimensions that most uniform or mixed null samples do not lie. For larger tile sizes in
particular, the shuffled null samples have large-scale components that are very similar to those of digit class images
yet lack the semantic meaning of digit classes. This type of null sample is also inspired by the observation that many
trained CNNs make decisions based on statistical properties of small regions within an image (e.g., texture of fur or
skin) rather than holistic or composite properties of the object within the image [8, 9, 10]. Using shuffled images as
null samples may force the model to learn to make decisions based on large-scale object composition more so than the
collection of local features.
5 Results
Using the training methods described above, we trained 30 models for each model type, which included a baseline
model type and a null-trained model type for all possible combinations of null image types. Thus, we obtained 30
6
Utilizing a null class to restrict decision spaces and defend against neural network adversarial attacks
Figure 5: Examples of null image samples. Top: Uniform noise samples. Middle: Mixed-digit samples. Bottom:
Shuffled-digit samples, with tiles sizes of 1, 2, 4, 7, and 14, from left to right, with two images per tile size.
Figure 6: Model accuracy scores on unperturbed MNIST test images. Bar heights and error bars are means and standard
deviations, respectively, computed across all 30 sets of trained and tested models. The baseline model is labeled base
while the null models are labeled with combinations of u, s, and m, indicating the types of null images on which the
models were trained—uniform, shuffled, and mixed, respectively.
instantiations of eight different models. For each “set” of eight models of a given training run, the random number
generator seed was set to a different value (1 of 30 seeds).
For each of 30 sets of eight models we: (1) measured the accuracy of the models on the MNIST test set, (2) used
the baseline model to create 1000 adversarial images from the MNIST test set, (2) scored the null-trained models
(hereafter referred to simply as the null models) on the adversarial images, and (3) scored the baseline and null models
on perturbed images generated over a large range of epsilon values (epsilon being the scalar multiplier of the noise
(gradient) image added to the source image when creating adversarial images—not to be confused with the epsilon term
of the Adam gradient descent optimizer).
5.1 MNIST test set scores for all models
Before testing models on adversarial images, we measured accuracy on the unperturbed MNIST test set images. As
seen in Figure 6, accuracy is approximately 99% for all model types, with the null models performing slightly worse
than the baseline models. This modest accuracy drop is likely due to the tighter decision spaces of the null models
versus the baseline models—lowering null model generalizability but also lowering the likelihood of misclassification
of adversarial images, as will be shown.
5.2 Adversarial examples at epsilon threshold
For this study we used the fast gradient sign method [11] (FGSM) for generating adversarial images. When using
FGSM, the signed gradient image is multiplied by a scalar value, added to the source image from which the gradient was
computed, and the composite is clipped to maintain the range of values of the original MNIST digits (typically scaled to
[0, 1], as in this study). Several research groups [4, 12, 5] have explored adversarial images created at epsilon=0.3,
presumably finding that for this value (1) many of the perturbed images will be misclassified by the source (baseline)
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Figure 7: Examples of adversarial images created from a baseline model. Each image was created with the smallest
epsilon value (epsilon threshold) possible such that the source model misclassified the image. Images that are
misclassified are given a red border (which is all of them in this figure, by design). Numbers above each plot are, in
order: source image label, model prediction label, and score (probability) for the predicted label.
Figure 8: Perturbed images identical to those in Figure 2, except with epsilon values 1.5 times larger. Images appear
slightly noisier although often remain clearly identifiable to humans. Probability scores of predicted classes are much
larger, however, often reaching 0.9 or higher. The source model misclassified all the images, as indicated by the red
borders. Plots are titled in the same manner as in Figure 7.
model, and (2) a large subset of those perturbed images continue to be perceived by humans as digits of the same class
as the source images from which they were derived (albeit with perceptible noise in many cases).
Rather than selecting a single epsilon value when generating adversarial images, we instead computed the signed gradient
image and then searched for the minimum epsilon value (within tolerance of 10-3) that resulted in a misclassification by
the source model for that specific gradient and source image. Thus, we found the epsilon threshold for each image, and
all adversarial images created in this manner lie very close to a boundary between decision spaces.
In Figure 7, we display 30 examples of the 1000 adversarial images created for use with a single set of eight models
(baseline plus null models). A different set of 1000 adversarial examples is created for each of the 30 sets of eight
models. Most of the perturbed images are perceptually identifiable as belonging to the digit class of the source image,
with varying degrees of detectable noise. Because the images were created just above epsilon threshold, the probability
scores of the predicted class given by the model are relatively low (often near 0.5). To see the impact of slightly larger
epsilon values on both the image quality and resulting probability scores, we created a set of perturbed images identical
to those of Figure 7 except epsilon values were increased by a factor of 1.5, thereby moving them further away from
decision boundaries in most cases. As seen in Figure 8, compared to those of Figure 7, image perturbations are more
apparent although most images are still clearly identifiable (by humans) as the digit class from which they were derived.
Probability scores generated by the source model are much higher, however—in line with those of the most poignant
adversarial examples highlighted by the machine learning community.
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Figure 9: Distribution of epsilon values at threshold. A composite histogram (left) and composite cumulative histogram
(right) are plotted for the adversarial images created from all 30 baseline models. Individual histograms and cumulative
histograms were created for each baseline model’s adversarial images, with a bin size of 0.05. Displayed curves are
the median counts across the 30 sets of adversarial images, with shaded areas indicating the minimum and maximum
values.
Despite intentionally creating adversarial images with the minimum perturbation possible, many still have an epsilon
value near 0.3. As seen in Figure 9, the distribution of epsilon values across all epsilon-threshold adversarial images
(30,000 in total) peaks near 0.2, with more than 80% of the values falling below 0.4.
Having created adversarial images for each baseline model, we then tested those images on the null models of the same
set (seven null models)1, determining the percentage of adversarial images that were classified correctly, misclassified
(as a digit class other than that of the source image), or unclassified (predicted to be in the null class). Results are shown
in Figure 10. As desired, misclassifications drop to near zero when models are trained on a variety of null images in
addition to digit images. When training with certain types of null images, most of the epsilon-threshold adversarial
images are instead classified as null images, and a small number are correctly classified, in contrast to results from the
baseline model.
Examples of null model predictions and scores for specific images are shown in Figure 11 through Figure 17. All
images are the same as those of Figure 7. As the variety of null image types on which the null model was trained
increases, models increasingly classify adversarial examples as null/unclassified, rather than misclassifying them—a
trend also seen in the collective results reported in Figure 10.
5.3 Adversarial examples across a range of epsilon values
We next examined model performances across a larger range of perturbations, systematically varying epsilon from 0
to 1, generating a set of perturbed images for each epsilon value, and scoring the models on those images. Similar to
the previous epsilon-threshold testing, 1000 perturbed images were created from each baseline model, and tested on
all models within the same set. Because the epsilon values were varied, the baseline model itself was tested on these
perturbed images, as well as the null models.
Results are summarized in Figure 18. As expected, the baseline models score perfectly when epsilon is equal to zero
(only MNIST test set images that were given a correct classification by a baseline model were considered as source
images for the creation of perturbed images), but scores fall to nearly zero when epsilon is equal to one. It is worth
noting that although an epsilon value of one is greater than the epsilon threshold for all the perturbed images, this does
not mean that the baseline model misclassification error rate must reach 100% at high epsilon. This is because for some
perturbed images, misclassification occurs at epsilon threshold (by definition), but reverts to the correct classification as
epsilon is increased further.
We briefly note three general null model trends exhibited in Figure 18, and reserve further comments for the Discussion
section. First, the null models trained solely on uniform-noise null samples show relatively weak resistance to adversarial
1There is nothing that naturally groups our trained models into sets of eight (one baseline and seven null models), except that
the eight models were trained sequentially inside a for loop, which was initialized with a unique random number generator seed.
Thus, adversarial images could have been tested on all 7×30 = 210 null models, rather than testing adversarial images only on null
models within the same set as the baseline model from which the image were created. This was not done, however, for the sake of
computational expediency.
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Figure 10: Model scores on adversarial images at epsilon threshold. Green: classified correctly. Red: misclassified
(classifying an image as a digit class other than that of the source image). Blue: unclassified (a null classification). Bar
height are means and error bars are standard deviations, computed across the 30 sets of eight models. The baseline
model is labeled base while the null models are labeled with combinations of u, s, and m, indicating the types of null
images on which the models were trained—uniform, shuffled, and mixed, respectively.
Figure 11: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with uniform noise null images.
Colors and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
Figure 12: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with shuffled noise null images. Colors
and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 13: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with uniform noise null images and
shuffled null images. Colors and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
Figure 14: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with mixed-class null images. Colors
and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
Figure 15: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with uniform noise null images and
mixed-class null images. Colors and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 16: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with shuffled null images and
mixed-class null images. Colors and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
Figure 17: Example adversarial images from Figure 7, scored by a model trained with uniform noise null images,
shuffled null images, and mixed-class null images. Colors and plot titles are as those in Figures 10 and 7, respectively.
images, performing only slightly better than the baseline models. Second, null models trained with null samples that
included mixed-class null images robustly defend against perturbed images for epsilon values up to roughly 0.6—a
range that covers nearly all of the epsilon-threshold adversarial examples. Here we use the word defend to mean that
images are either classified correctly or given a null classification, rather than being misclassified as a digit other than
that of the source image. The defense begins to breakdown as epsilon increases above 0.6. Finally, null models trained
with null samples that included shuffled images robustly defend against perturbed images with epsilon values roughly
0.5 and above. When trained on both mixed-class images and shuffled images, null models robustly defend against
perturbed images across the full range of tested epsilon values.
To highlight the performance difference between the baseline models and the null models trained with shuffled
and/or mixed-class images, we replot some of the Figure 18 data in Figure 19. Therein, one can directly compare
model misclassification scores. As seen in the rightmost panel, the best performing null models make almost no
misclassification errors. However, they do not generalize as well as the baseline models—giving a null classification to
nearly all perturbed images with an epsilon value greater than 0.1.
6 Discussion
Our findings suggest that training with a null class can provide a defense against adversarial attacks by allowing the
model to give perturbed images a null classification rather than misclassifying objects within those images. For some
applications this may be a perfectly acceptable behavior. A key component of this success is the use of mixed-digit
null samples during training. Owing to the fact that the majority of the MNIST images have pixel values that are
nearly binary, these images lie near corners of the hypercube input space. The signed gradient moves samples along
12
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Figure 18: Null models defend against adversarial images across a range of epsilon values. Each panel summarizes the
predictions made by the specified model type (panel titles indicate the type of null images used during training) as a
function of epsilon, for a set of perturbed images created from the baseline model within each set of models. Green:
classified correctly. Red: misclassified. Blue: unclassified (a null classification). Displayed curves are the median
counts across the 30 sets of perturbed images, with shaded areas indicating the 25th and 75th percentiles.
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Figure 19: Comparing baseline models to best performing null models. Scores for baseline models are presented in all
panels. The type of null model in each panel is indicated by the panel title. Red: misclassified. Blue: unclassified (a
null classification). Displayed curves are the median counts across the 30 sets of perturbed images, with shaded areas
indicating the 25th and 75th percentiles. Shaded areas are colored gray for the baseline models, for improved visual
contrast with the null model results.
the faces of the hypercube, away from the corner of the source image and toward a different corner. The mixed-digit
nulls, for the most part, lie on the faces of the hypercube, between the corners, thereby forcing the model to restrict
digit class decision spaces to hypercube corners. The mixed-digit null samples are particularly effective in preventing
misclassification of traditional adversarial images—those with lower epsilon values and with appearances that are
semantically similar or identical to those of their respective source images.
In contrast, the shuffled-digit null images are effective in preventing misclassification of high-epsilon images as a digit
class. Images perturbed in this manner are often far away from their source images in the image space, and not visually
identifiable as any of the digit classes. Conventional models may nonetheless classify these images as one of the digit
classes, with strong confidence. Our null-trained models rarely make this error. Like the unperturbed MNIST images,
the shuffled-digit null images lie near corners of the hypercube input space. Thus their use as null samples during
training can be seen as further restricting the digit class decision spaces to a smaller subset of hypercube corners.
Despite the success of these models in detecting perturbed images and classifying them as nulls, the models fail to
correctly classify digits in perturbed images that are easily identifiable by humans—e.g., the majority of the blue-
bordered images in Figure 17. Recent work has demonstrated that simply training a conventional model with images
corrupted by Gaussian and speckle noise provides a robustness against not only those classes of noise, but to unseen
types of corruption as well [13]. We speculate that combing such training along with the null-class training examined in
this report may lead to models that increasingly perform like humans—accurately classifying perturbed images that
maintain their original semantic meaning, while detecting images that have little or no semantic relation to the set of
object classes and thus classifying those images as nulls.
While encouraging, the findings of this report do not ensure similar success under other models, tasks, and conditions.
Further research is needed to assess the efficacy of the approach on photorealistic imagery (e.g., ImageNet) and when
alternative methods of creating adversarial images are used, such as projected gradient descent [4].
7 Conclusion
The conventional way in which classification models are architected and trained force the decision spaces of the classes
to fill the entire input space. Our results suggest that this results in decision boundaries which can easily be crossed by
adversarial examples, while maintaining an appearance and semantic meaning close to that of the unperturbed image.
Including null samples during training, and removing the restriction that the model classify all possible inputs as one of
the object classes, results in tighter object decision spaces, with a null space between those decision spaces.
Our approach is computationally efficient both during training and during inference, allowing for its potential use even
with larger models and more challenging tasks, although its effectiveness under such conditions remains to be tested.
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